Introduction
At the end of 2010, the 413 non-financial firms in the S&P 500 held $1.10 trillion in cash and cash equivalents, which amounted to 11% of their combined total assets. This sizable level of cash holdings is hardly unique to American firms. In our sample of firms from 48 countries, cash holdings averaged 17% of total assets, exceeding 20% in three countries, namely, Egypt, Hong Kong, and Israel. While substantial liquidity seems to be the universal norm, there are significant cross-country differences in corporate cash holdings. Among countries with at least 400 firm-year observations in our sample, average cash holdings as a percentage of total assets range from 6.6% in Chile to 22.7% in Hong Kong. Our goal is to extend the literature that seeks to explain these differences by focusing on disparities in creditor rights and governance quality.
This paper focuses on the effects of creditors rather than shareholders on corporate cash holdings. A number of researchers have studied the association between minority shareholder rights and cash holdings and have concluded that greater shareholder rights are associated with smaller corporate cash levels and/or increased value of cash [Kalcheva and Lins (2007 ), Dittmar et al. (2003 ), and Pinkowitz et al. (2006 ]. Creditors are different than shareholders as they have different goals and perspectives on risk and thus the relationship between creditor rights and cash levels may not be the same as the association between shareholder rights and cash holdings.
Creditors supply funds to firms on the expectation that those funds will be repaid with interest. In virtually all legal regimes, failure to meet this expectation typically results in the bankruptcy of the borrower. However, the ramifications of a bankruptcy as well as other consequences of defaulting vary from one country to another. Prior research has demonstrated that these differences in creditor rights have significant effects on corporate decisions, including investment decisions (Nini, Smith & Sufi, 2009) , capital structure choices (Roberts & Sufi, 3 2009), shareholder payouts (Brockman & Unlu, 2009 ) and corporate innovation (Acharya & Subramanian, 2009 ). In particular, Djankov, McLiesh & Shleifer (2007) show that stronger creditor rights facilitate an increase in the supply of credit by ameliorating the dead-weight cost attributable to creditor-debtor agency conflicts. As a result, stronger creditor rights can reduce the need for internal liquidity. Thus, we hypothesize a negative relation between the strength of creditor rights and corporate cash holdings.
Furthermore, we expect this relation to depend on the quality of country-level governance. In well-governed countries, creditors in general have little or no reasons to fear expropriation via strategic default or other opportunistic behavior by corporate insiders because strong country governance increases the ability of creditors to enforce their rights through the court system. Thus, differences in creditor rights are more meaningful in well-governed jurisdictions and stronger creditor rights in this instance would facilitate even greater credit availability and a lesser need for internal liquidity. For these reasons, we expect the negative association between corporate cash holdings and creditor rights to be stronger among wellgoverned countries.
In contrast, lending in poorly governed countries potentially exposes creditors to significant expropriation risk. Thus, rational lenders would restrict the supply of credit in such jurisdictions. Consistent with this, Jappelli, Pagano & Bianco (2005) show that credit availability is lower in jurisdictions with poorer judicial efficiency. Similarly, Fabbri (2002) shows that judicial efficiency is positively related with the flow and stock of corporate debt. This suggests that the need for internal liquidity is higher in poorly governed countries, which would imply higher cash holdings on average. Nevertheless, when creditors do lend in poorly governed countries, it is plausible to expect them to impose conditions and encourage corporate strategies 4 that increase the likelihood of repayment in light of the higher expropriation risks. One such strategy would be to encourage or require higher cash holdings, but the ability of creditors to demand and the willingness of management to acquiesce to such conditions would depend on the strength of creditor rights. Even in poorly governed countries, the consequences to management of a failure to pay back creditors are most likely worse when creditor rights are strong. Thus, we expect a positive association between creditor rights and cash levels in countries with poor governance. Alternatively, if country governance dominates creditor rights so that strong creditor rights are meaningless in poorly governed countries, then we should find no effect for creditor rights on cash holdings in countries with weak governance.
We test these hypotheses on a sample of over 19,000 unique firms from 48 countries over 1996-2006. For the full sample, we find that corporate cash holdings decline significantly with the strength of creditor rights. In particular, an increase of one standard deviation in creditor rights is associated with a reduction of 1.2 percentage points in the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets after controlling for other firm-and country-level determinants of corporate liquidity. Since the unconditional average cash ratio is 17.3%, this is economically non-trivial.
Next, we classify the sample into two groups based on the strength of country-level governance, i.e., well-governed and poorly governed countries, and perform separate analysis for each group. As expected, we find a strong negative relation between corporate cash holdings and the strength of creditor rights in well-governed countries. Thus, good governance appears to make creditor rights more valuable, which in turn reduces the need for corporate cash holdings as creditors maintain an ample supply of credit. When country governance is poor, however, we find a positive relation between cash holdings and creditor rights. This is consistent with our 5 hypothesis that in this environment, creditors are concerned about expropriation and would rationally restrict the supply of credit, forcing greater internal liquidity. Nevertheless, if creditors possess sufficient rights, creditors and corporate insiders will agree that it is in their best interests for the firm to hold more cash.
Our results also indicate that higher shareholder rights are generally associated with lower levels of cash holdings, as previous researchers have found. In a new result, we show that this effect is more pronounced when country governance is weak. Shareholders in these settings appear to use their powers to "force" management to hold less cash. In contrast, when country governance is strong other mechanisms limit management from holding excess cash and strong shareholder rights do not appear to make a difference.
These results extend the literature on cash holdings by further illustrating the significance of country-level institutional differences in explaining corporate cash holdings, over and above the effects of firm-specific variables. Invariably, managers must consider the environments in which their firms operate when making policy choices. Our results suggest that the strength of creditor rights and country level governance constitute an important dimension of these considerations in corporate liquidity decisions.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. We present a brief review of the relevant literature in Section 2, and discuss our data and methodology in Section 3. Section 4 contains our tests and results, while Section 5 concludes with a brief summary.
A brief review of relevant literature
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In this section, we review two streams of literature: (1) the determinants of cash holdings, with an emphasis on agency costs and the role of governance in reducing these costs, and (2) the influence of creditor rights on corporate decision-making.
Cash holdings
The tradeoff model provides a useful way to examine the determinants of corporate cash holdings. 1 In this model, the optimal level of cash holdings occurs at the point when the marginal cost of holding the next dollar of cash equals its marginal benefit. The costs of holding cash consist of the lower return on cash relative to other assets and the possibility that managers will use cash unwisely. For example, managers could spend cash on unnecessary perks, negative net present value projects, or simply expropriate it. As Myers & Rajan (1998) point out, cash can disappear more easily than physical assets such as plant and equipment. The benefits of holding cash are the savings on transaction costs if the firm would have to raise funds or liquidate assets in order to make payments. In addition, firms benefit when they have liquid assets to finance investments if the alternative would involve raising funds at a high cost.
Based on these considerations, the trade-off model suggests a number of factors as potential determinants of corporate cash holdings. These factors motivate our control variables.
We discuss them below:
Asymmetric information: Firms that are subject to a higher degree of information asymmetry would be expected to have higher cash holdings because it is more costly for them to raise funds (2006) show that cash is worth considerably more in countries with good investor protection than in countries with poor investor protection. They also indicate that dividends are worth more for firms residing in countries with low investor protection than for firms located in countries with high investor protection.
Similarly, Fresard and Salva (2010) observe that investors place a higher value on excess cash for foreign companies that list on the US exchanges than for similar firms that list only in their home country. These findings suggest that minority investors are concerned about the possibility of firms expropriating their funds in poorly governed countries and that dividend payments reduce the possible amount of expropriation.
In summary, prior research has shown that agency issues are likely a determinant of cash holdings for firms and that governance quality is important both for the level of cash holdings and for cash valuation. Later in the paper we will explore whether governance influences the relationship between creditor rights and cash holdings.
Creditor rights
Traditionally, the emphasis in finance has been on the powers of creditors during bankruptcy or during periods of financial distress. France, Germany, Japan, UK, and US. However, neither study examined the role of governance in influencing the relationship between creditor rights and cash levels.
Strong country governance increases the value of creditor rights, which suggests that the expected negative relation between creditor rights and cash holdings would strengthen among well-governed countries. In contrast, weak country governance raises the risk of expropriation by corporate insiders, which lenders would seek to mitigate. In this regard, strong creditor rights can empower lenders in poorly governed countries to demand higher cash reserves as protection against expropriation. Thus, we hypothesize a positive relation between creditor rights and cash holdings in poorly governed countries. Alternatively, poor country governance can render creditor rights meaningless, in which case we expect no relation between creditor rights and cash holdings in poorly governed countries. We formalize these hypotheses below:
Hypothesis 2. Strong country governance magnifies the negative relation between corporate cash holdings and creditor rights. 
Data Sources and Methodology
Data sources
We obtain data on creditor rights from Djankov et al. (2007) . They rate the powers of secured lenders during bankruptcy, scoring countries on four attributes: "(1) whether there are restrictions, such as creditor consent, when a debtor files for reorganization; (2) whether secured creditors are able to seize their collateral after the petition for reorganization is approved, that is, whether there is no automatic stay or asset freeze imposed by the court; (3) We use a broad definition of country governance based on data from the World Bank. As a result, we use scores for the immediately preceding year for each of these years in order to prevent a significant data loss.
We also include a variable for shareholder rights in our models since Dittmar et al. (2003) show 
Basic model
The following regression equation is our basic model to examine the impact of creditor rights on cash levels. The precise definitions for all the variables are given in and IND is a set of industry dummies based on 2-digit SIC codes.
We include two variables in this basic model that were not discussed in the literature section. The first is ownership (OWN it ), defined as the ownership structure at time t for firm i, that is, the percentage of shares held by insiders and outsiders that own at least 5 percent of the stock. 6 Ownership structure may influence cash holdings in several ways. We estimate our initial model using ordinary least squares (OLS) with standard errors clustered at the firm level. We repeat our analysis based on an alternative definition of cash (as well as some of the explanatory variables) to see if our main findings are robust to different definitions of cash holdings. In some regressions, we control for potential endogeneity by using lagged values of independent variables. Later, we discuss results using an instrumental variable approach. have the highest score (4). The U.S. has a score of one. Scores for shareholder rights range from one to five, with higher scores indicating better rights for minority shareholders. Highest scoring countries are Chile, Hong Kong, India, Ireland, Malaysia, Singapore, South Africa, the U.K. and Spain. Venezuela, China, and Jordan have the lowest score while the U.S. has a score of four. Table 2 about here Table 3 about here
Results
Descriptive statistics: cash holdings
------------------------------------ Insert------------------------------------------------------------------------ Insert------------------------------------
Descriptive statistics and correlations: other variables
Panel A of Table 4 provides descriptive statistics for the variables in our model for five different samples: (1) all countries, (2) low creditor rights countries, (3) high creditor rights countries, (4) poorly governed countries, and (5) well-governed countries. We define low creditor rights countries as those with creditor rights scores of 2 or lower and high creditor rights countries as those that score above 2. We define poorly governed countries as those scoring at or below the first quartile on the World Bank country governance index and well-governed 18 countries as those scoring at or above the third quartile. We also provide statistical comparisons of the variables for low vs. high creditor rights countries as well as poorly governed vs. wellgoverned countries.
As Table 4 shows, firms in countries with fewer creditor rights hold significantly more cash than those in countries with more creditor rights, which is consistent with H1. Specifically, the average cash ratio of 18.0% for firms in low creditor rights countries is significantly higher than the 15.8% observed among firms in countries with more creditor rights. The medians depict a similar pattern.
Table 4 also shows that countries with fewer creditor rights have fewer shareholder rights and poorer quality country governance. In addition, firms in these countries are larger, have more growth opportunities, invest more in R&D, and generate more cash from operations. They also are exposed to a higher degree of information asymmetry, use more debt, and have lower ownership concentrations. Furthermore, the univariate comparisons reveal that firms in poorly governed countries hold more cash (at the median) than those in well-governed countries, although the means suggest the opposite. In addition, firms in poorly governed countries are larger, have fewer growth opportunities, use more debt, invest less in R&D, and have higher ownership by insiders and significant outsiders. Table 4 presents pair-wise correlations for the variables used in our regressions. The correlation between creditor rights and cash holdings is negative while shareholder rights and cash holdings are positively correlated. Similarly, governance and cash holdings are positively correlated, as are shareholder rights and creditor rights. As in previous studies, we find a strong positive correlation between market-to-book ratios and cash holdings, which suggests that the greater are the investments opportunities, the more cash is held. In 19 addition, real size and cash holdings are negatively correlated, indicating that larger firms generally hold less cash. Net working capital has a negative correlation with cash holdings, suggesting that these assets can be more easily substituted for cash than can fixed assets. R&D has a positive correlation with cash, which suggests that firms that invest more in R&D prefer to hold more cash. The correlation between asymmetric information and cash is positive and suggests that firm with more asymmetric information hold more cash, as would be expected.
Panel B of
Cash flow has a negative relationship with cash as does leverage. Finally, ownership has a small negative correlation with cash. Next, we examine these relations in a multivariate setting by estimating regression models of equation (1) above.
Insert Table 4 
about here ------------------------------------
Basic regression results
Table 5 presents our initial regression findings based on the full sample. Models (1) - (5) report the results of models where all variables are contemporaneous, while Models (6) - (8) show results of regressions that employ lagged independent variables as an initial step in addressing potential endogeneity issues, especially between leverage and cash holdings.
Creditor Rights As Table 5 shows, creditor rights (CR) has a reliably negative coefficient in all models. This is true regardless of whether or not shareholder rights (SR) and/or the governance index (GOV) are included. In no instance does the inclusion of these two variables in the regressions change the sign or significance of CR. Our findings suggest that greater creditor rights are associated with lower corporate cash holdings. In Model (2), which controls for shareholder 20 rights and country-level governance, the coefficient of CR is -0.011. Since the standard deviation of CR is 1.13, this implies that an increase of one standard deviation in creditor rights is associated with a reduction of 1.2 percentage points in cash holdings. Compared to the full sample average cash ratio of 17.3%, this amounts to an economically significant reduction of 6.9% in corporate cash holdings.
This result is consistent with hypothesis H1, which states that stronger creditor rights facilitate a reduced need for internal corporate liquidity by enhancing the supply of credit. The result also suggests that creditors in general do not use their powers to "force" management to hold more cash. Creditors may realize that holding cash has a cost (lower return) and that it is generally better for management in the long-run to pursue a value maximization strategy that may involve holding less cash.
Next, we test hypotheses H2, H3a, H3b on how country-level governance mediates the effect of creditor rights on corporate cash holdings. Models (4) and (7) include an indicator variable for well-governed countries (i.e., those scoring at or above the third quartile on the governance index) and the interaction of this variable with creditor rights. As argued earlier, we expect the interaction variable to be negative and significant under H2. As Table 5 shows, the results are consistent with our hypothesis, with the interaction term negative and significant at the 1% level in each model. Similarly, Models (3) and (6) include an indicator variable that equals one for poorly governed countries, that is, those that scored at or below the first quartile on the World Bank governance index, as well as an additional variable that interacts this indicator variable and creditor rights. We expect this interaction variable to be positive if stronger rights allow creditors to demand higher cash holdings in poorly governed countries to safeguard against higher 21 expropriation risks as stated in H3a. In contrast, the interaction term would be insignificant if weak governance dominates any potential benefits of stronger creditor rights as stated in H3b.
As Table 5 shows, the interaction term is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level in each regression, which is consistent with the former hypothesis.
We investigate these results further by estimating separate regressions for poorly governed and well-governed countries. The primary advantage of this approach over using interaction variables is that it does not constrain other variables in the model to have the same effects on corporate cash holdings in poorly governed and well-governed countries. We present results in Table 6 . As the table shows, results are consistent with those obtained in Table 5 using interaction variables. Specifically, the coefficient for creditor rights is positive and significant in each regression for poorly governed countries. In contrast, the relation is significantly negative in well-governed countries. These results do not change regardless of whether we use contemporaneous or lagged independent variables.
Other Variables
Our results for other variables are largely consistent with prior research and/or expectations. We discuss these results in two parts, focusing first on country-level variables. As Table 5 shows, country-level governance is consistently negatively related with corporate cash holdings. Thus, companies located in well-governed countries tend to hold less cash, which is consistent with the argument that strong governance ameliorates potential agency problems between corporate insiders and outside investors (creditors and shareholders). Similarly, we find a negative relation between shareholder rights and cash holdings, which is consistent with Dittmar et al. (2003) . 22 In a surprising result, we find a positive and significant impact for stock market capitalization (STOCKCAP), which suggests that firms in countries that have larger stock markets hold more cash. This is contrary to our expectation of a negative relation based on the argument that a larger stock market is indicative of a developed capital market, which should facilitate access to external finance and reduce the need for internal liquidity. A potential explanation for this result is that STOCKCAP measures stock market size relative to the GDP.
Since countries with smaller stock markets also tend to have smaller GDPs, cross-sectional differences in STOCKCAP may not capture differences in capital market accessibility.
Our results for firm-specific variables are in line with prior studies such as Opler et al.
(1999) and Dittmar et al. (2003) . Table 5 shows a positive relation between market-to-book ratio and cash holdings, suggesting that firms with more investment opportunities generally hold more cash. Real firm size (RSIZE) has a negative and significant coefficient, which is consistent with the argument that larger firms can access capital markets more easily and thus do not need to hold as much cash. Net working capital (NWC) has a negative sign indicating that these assets can act as substitutes for cash since they can be sold or liquidated rather easily. R&D has a positive relation with cash holdings. Firms that invest more in R&D may need to hold more cash because they are constrained in raising external funds due to a higher degree of information asymmetry. Like Opler et al. (1999) , we find that leverage (LEV) has a significantly negative effect on cash holdings. Surprisingly, however, we also find that cash flow (CFLOW) is negatively related with cash holdings. It could be the case that high cash flow firms decrease their cash holdings because they feel confident that their stockpile can be easily replenished.
------------------------------------Insert Tables 5 and 6 about here ------------------------------------23
Our results are not clear concerning ownership, especially when we lag the independent variables. Using contemporaneous values in Table 5 , OWN has a positive and significant effect, and the coefficient of the square of the ownership variable (OWNSQ) is negative and significant.
However, these two variables have just the opposite effects in regressions using lagged values.
Regression results for non-U.S. firms
Since U.S. firms constitute almost 40% of our sample, it is important to check that our results are not driven by U.S. observations. Table 7 reports results of our basic regression models when U.S. firms are excluded from the sample. Results are generally similar to those obtained for the full sample in Table 5 , although the negative effect of creditor rights on cash holdings is a little weaker when U.S. firms are excluded. Nevertheless, the moderating role of country-level governance on the relation between creditor rights and cash holdings remains very comparable to that obtained for the full sample.
With one exception, other results also remain unchanged when we exclude U.S. firms.
Specifically, we find a positive relation between cash holdings and information asymmetry among non-U.S. firms, which is consistent with our prior expectations. Asymmetric information problems may have severe impact on firms outside the U.S., and therefore firms subject to this problem hold more cash.
In unreported results, we also examine if our findings were driven by either U.K. firms or Japanese companies (second and third largest number of observations). Banks in Japan during the early years of our study exerted influence on Japanese firms to hold large cash balances [Iskandar-Datta and Jia (2012) and Pinkowitz and Williamson (2001) ] and this possibly could 24 have affected our overall results. Our main findings do not change when either U.K. firms or Japanese firms are excluded. Table 7 about here  ------------------------------------ 
------------------------------------Insert
Robustness results with alternative measure of cash
We repeat our regression analysis by employing an alternative measure of cash holdings used in the literature. In calculating this measure, we scale cash and short-term investments by net assets (i.e., total assets less cash and short-term investments) and do the same for net working capital and cash flow. Table 8 contains results of these regressions for the full sample and when U.S. firms are excluded. Table 9 presents results for poorly governed and well-governed countries. As these tables show, there are no meaningful changes in the effects of either the major variables or the control variables. In particular, we continue to find the same patterns of relation between creditor rights and cash holdings.
------------------------------------Insert Table 8 and 9 about here ------------------------------------
Joint determination of cash levels and debt
It is likely that debt and cash levels are jointly determined, in which case it would be inappropriate to use OLS to estimate equation (1). To address this problem we employ an instrumental variable for leverage. A major difficulty in finding an appropriate instrument for leverage is that variables that affect leverage are also very likely to affect cash holdings. An instrument for leverage should be correlated with leverage and be uncorrelated with the error 25 term in equation 1. We use the tangibility of the firm's assets as our instrument. In a regression with leverage as the dependent variable and using all of the exogenous variables in equation 1 plus the variable tangibility (computed as the ratio of net fixed assets to total assets) as independent variables, the coefficient for tangibility is significant at the one percent level. Hence tangibility satisfies the first criteria for an instrument. Unfortunately the second criteria for an instrument cannot be tested (see Woolridge (2000) , chapter 15) but we are unaware of any model that postulates tangibility as a determinant of corporate cash holdings. Table 10 presents our regressions using tangibility as the instrument for leverage and using both definitions for cash. Our results remain intact. Specifically with one exception, we continue to find a negative relation between creditor rights and cash holdings in the full sample as well as in the sample of well-governed countries. Also as before, we continue to find that cash holdings increase with creditor rights in poorly governed countries. Table 10 about here
Conclusions
This paper seeks to explain differences in corporate cash holdings by investigating the role of creditor rights. We hypothesize that strong creditor rights reduce corporate cash holdings by ameliorating the costs of creditor-borrower agency problems, which reduces the need for internal liquidity by expanding the supply of credit. We also hypothesize differences in these effects depending on the strength of country-level governance. We expect creditor rights to be more negatively related to cash holdings in well-governed countries since those rights are presumably more valuable in such jurisdictions. In contrast, borrowers in poorly governed 26 countries may hold more cash to assuage creditors' expropriation fears, especially when creditor rights are strong.
Our results support these hypotheses. We find a significant negative relation between creditor rights and cash holdings in the full sample. However, when the sample is broken down into well-governed and poorly governed countries, we find a negative and significant effect for creditor rights on cash holdings in the former and a positive relation in the latter group. These results are robust to alternative definitions of cash holdings, different country subsamples, and concerns about endogeneity. In particular, our results for creditor rights hold whether we use OLS with robust standard errors or employ instrumental variable regressions.
These results illustrate the importance of country-level variables in explaining differences in corporate cash holdings. High levels of corporate liquidity have attracted significant academic and public policy attentions in recent times. We contribute to these discussions by showing that firms respond to macro-level institutional factors in their liquidity decisions.
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